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Abstract

A file’s provenance is a detailing of its origins and activities. There are tools available
that are useful in maintaining the provenance of a file. Unfortunately for digital forensics,
these tools require prior installation on the computer of interest while provenance generating
events happen. The presented tool addresses this by reconstructing a file’s provenance from
several temporal artifacts. It identifies relevant temporal and user correlations between these
artifacts, and presents them to the user. A variety of predefined use cases and real world
data are tested against to demonstrate that this software allows examiners to draw useful
conclusions about the provenance of a file.
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1.

Introduction

Computer forensics, which involves analyzing a digital medium for evidence of or related
to a crime [8], requires the tracking and digesting of a myriad of files and their relationships.
Parsing through this information is a daunting task, and the time requirement of this analysis
can prevent an examiner from quickly obtaining the information they need to solve a crime.
The relationship between files and their origins, along with the times and ways in which they
were modified and accessed, and by whom, can help greatly speed up this process.
An object’s provenance is its place of origin, or its history [23]. Based on this definition,
file provenance, an important forensic resource and the inspiration for this study, is the
“ownership and the actions performed on a data object”[15]. Ownership describes who
created the file, or who brought the file onto the system, while actions describe post arrival
file interactions. Automating the identification of these digital data relationships can help
greatly expedite the forensic process.

1.1

Forensic Process

According to the Department of Justice, the steps in the forensic process are Preparation/Extraction, Identification, and Analysis [5]. Figure 1 shows these steps and their
presence within the greater scope of the investigation.

Figure 1: DOJ Forensic Steps [5]
When attempting to determine where a file originated from, an examiner starts by mounting the image they are interested in as read only. Mounting the image as read only ensures
1

the image integrity maintained, and that the data within is not altered in any way. This is
important, because if the image is modified it is no longer viable in a court room setting.
After the image is mounted, the examiner looks at the metadata for the file under investigation. The metadata contains a plethora of useful information, such as the creator of the
file, who last modified the file, and when these things occur. It may be tempting to just
take these values and assume that the origins of the file are known. Unfortunately, these
values are often missing, and are easily modified by a savvy cyber criminal. Therefore, the
examiner must either fill in the missing information, or validate whatever data is available.
The examiner should then view the mtime, ctime, and atime of the file they are
interested in [17]. The mtime is the last time the file was modified. It is updated whenever
the content of a file is changed. The ctime is also updated whenever a file’s content is
changed; however, it can additionally be updated whenever a file’s attributes are changed.
A file’s attributes can be changed by a number of factors, such as file movement, or ownership
change. The atime is the last time the file was interacted with in any way. This can be
a result of simply opening the file. To summarize: if the file is simply opened and viewed,
only the atime changes. If it is opened, viewed, and edited, the atime and mtime both
change. If the file is opened, edited, and placed into another directory, then all three of these
values change. It is also important to note that all three of these values change if a file is
copied and pasted. This is because copying and pasting is creating a new file. If a file is
simply moved this does not occur, as it is still the same file.
At this point, the examiner is free to pursue a number of paths, in whatever ordering
they choose. There are a number of actions that most examiners normally turn to in order to
determine the provenance of a file. The first is to use the tool log2timeline, in order to create
a time line of events that occurred on the image of interest. The examiner could always
construct a time line manually, but using a tool such as log2timeline is far more efficient.
log2timeline provides the examiner with information on all the activity within the system.
2

Generating this time line; however, takes a great deal of time. Fortunately, the examiner
most likely does not need a time line on all of the system’s activities. Therefore, they can
use filters to have the tool only run on the more relevant portions of the image.
Now that these time lines are available, the examiner begins to parse them in order to
gain a more thorough understanding of the system. The most valuable information is within
the system’s registry. Time lines of individual user activity are within the NTUSER.dat
hive, while the SYSTEM registry contains various system configuration information.
One of the richest sources of provenance on a file system is the registry [6]. The registry consists of a number of hive files that do anything from holding system configuration
information to tracking the activities of individual users. Whenever something happens on
the system, it is almost a guarantee that it impacts the registry in some way. All registry
keys have a value called the “last write time”. Whenever a relevant event occurs, the value
changes. This is what time line generators such as log2timeline look to when they construct
their time line of system events.
The registry consists of two separate types of hives: System hives, and User hives[6].
System hives include the Security, Security Account Manager (SAM), System, Software,
and AmCache hives. User hives include NTUSER.DAT and USRCLASS.DAT. System hives
associate with the overall functioning of the computer system itself, while user hives relate
to specific users (each user has their own NTUSER.DAT and USRCLASS.DAT hives). For
example, The security hive contains the system’s operations, as well as data pertaining to
configurations. The SAM hive stores user credentials, and enables user authentication both
locally and remotely. The most valuable registry for file provenance is the NTUSER.DAT
user hive, as it logs user activities, including file interactions and program executions.

3

1.2

Problem Statement

Based on the brief summary above of the path an examiner takes to rebuild a file’s
provenance on a forensic image, it is clear that this task is quite possible. Unfortunately,
gathering all of this data and parsing it is time consuming, there is currently no software
that automates the entire process. Software that can quickly rebuild the provenance of a file
by noting correlations and generating time lines can save forensic professionals a great deal
of time, and allow them to more quickly determine the origins and activities of any files of
interest to an investigation.
Completing this task on a forensic image is far more difficult than on a live machine. A
live machine provides access to the system’s memory, and the ability to track all activity
as it occurs. With a forensic image, the user faces the consequences of large amounts of
time passing without the tracking of any system activity. During this time period, data
availability can fade as it is automatically wiped from the system [4]. Information can
also be purposefully removed, and this activity is much more difficult to discover on a
forensic image. Access to the system’s Random Access Memory (RAM) is lost as well, as all
information stored within RAM is volatile. This includes data in use by applications that
the user currently has open, which can contain valuable insights into the user’s activities.
Therefore, any automated discovery of provenance related information is restricted to the
system’s registry hives, various configuration files, and file metadata.

1.3

Hypothesis

It is possible to recreate the provenance of a file located on a forensic image, in most
cases. This is true as long as enough information is available within the metadata of the file,
as well as the registry. It is possible to automate the process used to gather this provenance
information using forensic tools that are already available. This thesis creates a proof of
4

concept algorithm that automates the gathering of provenance, without creating software
that is redundant enough to account for all possibilities or be fully and undoubtedly correct.
The provenance provided by this algorithm requires verification by the examiner; however,
the provenance is highly useful in tailoring the investigative process and saving time.

1.4

Assumptions

This thesis assumes that the files this tool analyzes do not have their provenance purposefully obfuscated. Dealing with the activity of tools such as Timestomp [24] is outside of the
scope of this research project. This tool is useful as a guide to further tailor the investigative
process, and is not intended to draw definitive conclusions about the provenance of a file.

1.5

Contributions

This thesis presents a proof of concept piece of software named AutoProv, short for
Automated Provenance, that shows it is possible to thoroughly recreate the provenance of
a file of interest on a forensic image. All previous provenance rebuilding efforts focused
on dealing with live images, and tracking all user and program activities in order to rebuild
provenance. AutoProv shows that, while not nearly as thorough as fully tracking provenance
on a live image, it is possible to recreate large portions of the provenance of a file present on a
forensic image. This is especially true when dealing with files that provide useful metadata,
such as Microsoft Office documents.

1.6

Summary

A file’s provenance consists of various forensic artifacts that enable the discovery of a file’s
history. This includes the file’s creation, as well as any other movements and modifications
enacted upon the file. Tools already exist that enable the automated gathering of a file’s

5

provenance on a live system. This thesis shows that automated provenance gathering is also
possible on a forensic image.

6

2.

Related Work

The work related to this topic includes anything related to file provenance, and the
gathering of provenance data. Following the discussion of provenance and its sources is a
passage on the current systems that are in place to automatically track file provenance.
These “file provenance maintenance systems” are constantly active, tracking all activities
on the system in order to build a complete provenance picture. The discussion then focuses
on studies related to automating forensic analysis without the use of a backbone system,
such as a File Provenance Maintenance System (FPMS). A summary of the various tools
discussed within this chapter is available within Table 1.
Table 1: Tool Summary Table
Tool Summary
Provenance

Image

Time

Line

Automation

Maintenance

Analysis

Generation

PASS

FTK

log2timeline

pyflag

FiPS

EnCASE

PLASO

ramparser

OPUS

TSK

PyDFT

FACE

Zeitline

RegRipper

Systems

Tapestry

2.1

Provenance

Provenance refers to the earliest known history of something. It can also refer to the
record of ownership of an object [23]. Therefore it makes sense that when dealing with
computers, provenance is the origins of a piece of data, its relationship to other pieces of

7

data, as well as the process that created it. Provenance data is extremely valuable to scientific
forensic communities. It ensures that data is accurate, as well as current. There are many
ways that files can obtain additional provenance data. A file created by one person could be
edited by many others. It could be transferred between them using FTP, email, and many
other protocols and methods. The source of some of its content may be from another file,
which could be copied and pasted over. All of these factors contribute to the origins of a file.
One important part of provenance analysis is understanding the timing associated with
the events surrounding the creation, modification, and transference of a file. Analyzing
the history associated with a file provides excellent insights to examiners on the origins
of that file. A simple starting point for learning about a file’s creation and movements is
time stamps. Time stamps exist in some form on most if not all file systems, and provide
interesting insights into a file’s modification history, or even its creation. Unfortunately,
the recording of useful history such as last access time is disabled by many system power
users. Tools such as Timestomp allow users to alter their time stamps and can complicate
an examiner’s attempts at tracking user history.
Provenance is also useful as meta-data, especially within scientific and business applications [15]. Meta-data can allow for much more powerful searches, enabling a user to search
for a file based on who worked on it in the past, or its origins. Many times users forget the
exact document that is of interest, but remember that they sent an email to someone about
relevant data. With this information, it is possible to narrow the spectrum of possible documents, allowing the user to more quickly identify the object of interest. Correcting mistakes
is another valuable use of provenance data. A user may create a file that contains data that
influences other files. If that data is incorrect, it has far reaching consequences that the
original creator is not aware of. Fortunately, with provenance, the creator of the original
data can find out who else is using this information, and alert them to the correction.
A large part of forensic investigations involves searching for a particular piece of data
8

within a file. Many tools automatically search the system’s storage for a string or other
relevant information [2]. However, if the information is split between multiple locations,
such as the registry and the browser history, the tool may fail. Therefore it is important
for examiners to find out the search methodology of their tool of choice, and ensure that
it is able to find information split between multiple data units. Unallocated data can also
contain important information. Examiners often search unallocated data units to determine
if there is any meaningful data present. TSK provides a tool, dls, that is able to accomplish
this task. According to TSK, data not used by the file system is unallocated. All other data
is allocated.
Technological changes inevitably bring with them more provenance acquisition challenges.
For example, the advent of Near Data Processing (NDP) is an important change in computer
architecture. In NDP “specific computations can be directly executed on the low frequency
wimpy cores used in storage devices” [1]. This has interesting implications for provenance,
as it could cause difficulties in tracking the changes to data that occur on these storage cores.
Provenance completeness is important for the fidelity of any provenance system, and without
this data the provenance is lacking. For this reason, computer hardware must become an
integrated part of the provenance process.

2.2

Sources of Provenance Data

One of the first places an inspector looks for provenance data is a file’s metadata. The
metadata of a file contains information on the creation date of the file [29]. It also records the
last modification date of the file, which is the last time a change was made. In many cases,
especially when dealing with Microsoft Office, the metadata also records the user name of
the individuals who create and modify the file. This information is valuable when trying to
determine attribution.
Finding redundant data for verification purposes is a powerful solution to the potential
9

incorrectness of time stamps and metadata. Registry files are an excellent source of this
kind of information, as well as browser history. Proxies and firewalls, entities that a suspect
cannot interact with without advanced skills, are also valuable for determining the a file’s
provenance.
The registry contains a number of hives that each possess data on the various system
and user operations [6]. For example, the security hive contains information on the audit
policies of the system. The audit policies determine whether certain information is available,
such as the history of users logging into the system. The SAM hive determines all the user
and group configurations/accounts on the system of interest. The most useful information
it presents includes the name and permissions of the groups and users present, the creation
date and time of the accounts and groups, and the date and time of each user’s last log
in. Information on USB devices is also available within the registry, as the system hive
keeps a log of USB activity. This information includes the date and time a USB device
was last attached to the system. USB data is valuable when combined with other relevant
system interactions. Through examining user activity during the time span of the USB’s
attachment, it is possible to determine what user account is associated with connection of
the USB device to the system.
Web browsers are one of the most common file sources, as users use them as an interface
to acquire various files from web hosts [19]. Email is another common file source, and many
users forgo desktop email solutions such as Microsoft Outlook, and choose to use a web
based solution from within their browser instead. Most browsers have a built in structure
for maintaining their web history, which is non-volatile. This history is useful for determining
the probability of a file arriving via web download, and the download source if this is the
case.
Proxies and firewalls often keep activity logs. These logs are valuable for verification
when an examiner is unsure of the validity of the data found within a system [32]. By cross10

referencing the information found within a firewall’s logs with the information of interest on
a system image, an examiner obtains greater certainty that the data is accurate.

2.3

Tools for Provenance Data

A variety of tools are available for gathering file provenance, and forensic data in general.
The three most common ones used in the initial analysis of an image are FTK, TSK, and
EnCase. EnCase requires much more training for the examiner than the other tool sets,
searching is confusing, and there is no log file available for examiners [18]. However, EnCase
has incredible search capabilities and allows for greater analytic convenience. FTK is easier
to use than EnCase, requiring less training for the examiner. This is mostly due to its
intuitive interface. Unfortunately it also has a lengthy image importing process and lacks
customization options [18]. TSK, on the other hand, has a vast array of customization
options thanks to Perl scripting, and works well with other Linux tools. Detracting from
this, is its lack of ability to identify encrypted files, and vagueness in notifying the operator
of existing overwritten files.
Log2timeline is a valuable tool for extracting temporal artifacts from digital media. The
historical data contained within a forensic image, when gathered from the many sources
that are available, is difficult to manage and parse effectively [12]. Log2timeline provides a
framework that helps forensics experts view the image’s history without becoming completely
overwhelmed with all of the information presented. It also bypasses much of the work that
comes with extracting time stamps from a variety of sources, as different artifacts store
time stamps in different formats. Log2timeline aggregates all of these time stamps into a
manageable format. It uses the same time stamp annotations as TSK: crtime is when the
file was created, mtime is the time at which the file was last modified, and atime is the
last time that the file was accessed.
Log2timeline excels at pulling all of the information from an image that has a time stamp
11

associated with it. Unfortunately, it does not allow for the aggregation of that data into a
form that allows for easily determining the provenance of a specific file. For a user interested
in a file’s provenance, the data that log2timeline provides may not be entirely and obviously
valuable. Therefore, it is necessary for someone interested in such data to apply filters in
order to avoid extraneous information, as well as employing other tools to aid them in quickly
finding the information of interest, such as a file’s metadata.
A useful tool for automating the task of pulling any relevant metadata from a file is
exiftool [13]. Exiftool is a Perl library and command line application, and allows the user to
view and edit the metadata on a number of files. Due to its ability to modify metadata as
well as read it, this tool is usable as a means of obfuscation to thwart examiners. It works
on a plethora of metadata formats, including: EXIF, GPS, IPTC, and many others. If this
tool fails to pull the relevant metadata from a file, the metadata most likely is not present.
The metadata of a file may often lack the information an examiner is searching for. The
system’s registry is invaluable for filling in any gaps.
Harlan Carvey created a tool, RegRipper , that makes gathering data from different
hive files within the registry much easier than manually parsing them[6]. For example,
the RegRipper plugin auditpol.pl extracts audit policy information from the registry
hive. Another useful pluggin, samparse , extracts user and group configuration/account
settings from the SAM hive.
If the examiner is interested in USB devices, RegRipper allows for the extraction of
relevant information from the system hive. The usbstor plugin allows them to determine
the installed external devices, as well as the date and time at which this took place, identifying the device by serial number. They then use the mountdev plugin to tie the device’s
serial number to a drive letter, or even a device model name. The usbdevices plugin is also
valuable for determining the last write times of the USB devices.
Other useful plugins give the user the ability to see various data related to the network
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cards, and connections made on the system of interest. The networkcards plugin provides
information on the networking interfaces present on the system at the time of image capture.
If the wireless access points the system connected to are of interest to the investigation, then
the ssid plugin obtains the SSID of the wireless access point (WAP), the MAC address,
as well as when the system last connected to this WAP. If more in depth information is
desired in regards to the WAPs, the networklist plugin is capable of filling in any gaps. It
is important to note that the time zone is factored into these outputs, which often creates a
discrepancy between the last write date/time and the last connected date/time.
An examiner needs confirmation to prove that a file originated from a web browser. It
is possible to employ the histories of the various web browsers installed on the system to
accomplish this. NirSoft produces a number of tools that enable quick and simple extraction
of this information, such as the MZHistoryView [27] tool that enables the extraction of the
Fire Fox browser’s history. The NirSoft tools present the web sites visited, as well as the
dates and times at which these visits occur. Unfortunately, this information is not presented
in chronological order, and the user must remedy this manually.
When activity occurs within a system as a result of the presence of a malicious file,
examiners often look to the network’s firewalls for external verification of the data found
within the system of interest. Keeping track of this information, and picking out data that is
potentially malicious is a difficult task. A tool called VisualFirewall[16] attempts to facilitate
examiner’s efforts by providing visual representations of the various activity within a firewall.
It provides four separate views that help narrow down the myriad of information present so
that an examiner can prioritize resources towards what is important to their investigation.
This data helps examiners learn about user interactions with the file post-arrival, or the file’s
original source.
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2.4

File Provenance Maintenance Systems

There are many tools related to the tracking and gathering of file provenance. The goal
of some of these tools is to create a system that monitors all file provenance on the host
machine. These systems are known as provenance maintenance systems, and they run in
the background of the system, doing what is needed to account for provenance data while
requiring no input from the user besides their normal computer operations. For example,
the Provenance Aware Storage System (PASS) “automatically collects, stores, manages, and
provides search for provenance”[25]. In order to accomplish this task, it maintains provenance
in memory and on disk. When dealing with a disk, the primary concern a forensics analyst
has is the references files have between one another. In memory, elements such as pipes and
sockets come into play and help determine how provenance is created.
Unfortunately, PASS has some shortcomings. It is unable to automatically collect opaque
provenance, which is defined as data originating “from a non-PASS source, such as a user,
another computer, or another file system that is not provenance aware” [25]. It also results
in substantial overhead when dealing with large files. In one of the scenarios presented this
processor consumption overhead was a large as 232.41%. Space consumption is also a major
issue with this implementation, as simply deleting 24 KB of data resulted in 3486 KB in
PASS overhead.
Sultana and Bertino[30] propose a system called FiPS as an alternative to the domainspecific approach used by PASS. In their words,“The fundamental problem with domainspecific approaches is that the data object and the provenance are managed by two separate
data management systems”. Not only does FiPS implement the functionality of PASS, it also
allows for the re-creation of files created using undocumented methodologies. This is a very
useful feature, as scientists and engineers often spend hours trying everything imaginable to
solve a problem, only to quickly forget the steps taken to generate this solution. With FiPS in
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place, these steps are recorded for later review and documentation, allowing for replication of
the methodology. FiPS avoids the overhead associated with system call tracing, the strategy
used in PASS, by enacting an implementation that places itself between the “Virtual File
System (VFS) and any other file system which results in space and time efficiency” [30].
All of these systems provide valuable forensic data, and enable the quick determination of
how a file arrived on a system, in addition to its relationship with other files. Unfortunately,
these systems require installation on the host machine in order to enable them to keep track
of provenance. They must be in place while the actions of interest occur, to allow for live
observance of the relevant system calls and file interactions that allow for the creation of
relationship and origin databases. This type of system is impractical when dealing with a
system that is not within a corporate, government, or scientific environment. If a computer
does not have one of these systems installed during the time of the incident, then there is
no relevant evidence for examiners to use. Most information systems do not come with file
provenance backbones pre-installed. Therefore, systems that allow for provenance gathering
from a data source that did not have any assisting provenance software in place are essential
for certain applications, such as criminal cases.
OPUS, or Observed Provenance in User Space, attempts to solve this by creating a provenance system that is able to be dropped into any existing system to capture provenance with
minor additional overhead/complication[28]. OPUS also accomplishes runtime context collection, allowing for more detailed provenance models. Instead of just focusing on major file
system operations like existing models, it captures all operations allowing for more detailed
models. This is accomplished by intercepting and capturing provenance at the C library
level through overriding the application symbol table. OPUS also introduces the Provenance Versioning Model (PVM). PVM provides a more formal view of important operations
and allows for the abstraction of I/O semantics, which enables clear understanding despite
differences in various operating systems. This type of functionality is important in a world
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where many file system entities are accessible simultaneously.
There are many provenance systems available that track activity on a system in real
time, ensuring that there is a thorough log of all activity within a system. It is important to
note, however, that most of these systems do not try to ensure the validity of the provenance
they capture through securing the provenance information. Securing provenance is a critical
endeavor, as provenance information is often put to use in determining guilt or innocence in
criminal cases. Researchers attempted to solve this by creating a provenance-aware system
prototype that focuses on ensuring the validity of provenance [9]. In this study, the capture of
provenance occurs at the application layer. Through thorough controls, the software ensures
that no one is able to add or remove provenance information, preventing undetected rewrites
of history. Trusted auditors verify provenance information, which is available in a format
that makes it easy to determine if alterations are present. Data writes are put to use for the
purpose of tracking this information, as they are far less computationally expensive to track
than data reads due to the quantity present in day to day user operations.

2.5

Automating Digital Forensics

Many of the forensic tools discussed in Section 2.3 allow examiners to retrieve data from
a disk image. However, these tools do not find evidence for the examiner. Instead, they
retrieve all files and data from the disk, as any of it is potentially relevant. The examiner
must then parse through all of this information, in order to find the pieces that are applicable
to the investigation at hand. Tools that automate the time consuming process of finding
pertinent evidence are extremely valuable. This is possible by locating files relevant to the
investigation, optimizing data organization and presentation, and by creating a time-line of
activity on the system.
One of the most difficult tasks for an examiner is determining what files within an image
are of interest to the investigation at hand. The examiner must spend a great deal of time
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parsing through potential sources of data, until finding something that is valuable. This
task is more easily accomplished by examiners with more experience, as they are adept at
finding other relevant files based on the data discovered thus far. Fortunately, tools are now
available that facilitate this task, and help to decrease the time required to accomplish this
process. Autopsy, or TSK, suggests additional searches based on items already marked as
evidence[4]. These evidence markers help to create a target definition, stored as an object.
Using these target objects, TSK searches for relevant evidence using various criteria provided
by the examiner.
The examiner uses this to search for evidence that relates to the time field of the object,
or the object’s application type. Carrier [4] also developed a system that analyzes outliers
in order to detect files that are out of place with the rest of the data. For example, root
kits or other attack tools would be considered outliers. Discovering out of place files in this
manner greatly aids the forensic examiner’s ability to quickly process the data presented
to them. The process behind discovering these outliers involves using file attributes to
determine whether a file is abnormal or not. Unfortunately, Carrier himself states that since
the multiple attribution method also results in some hidden files being missed, it is difficult
to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of his method of outlier detection.
A 2010 study by Margo and Smogor [20] reinforces the notion that automated analysis
is plausible. After finding that the semantic attributes necessary to perform advanced file
searches were exorbitantly difficult to extract, they decided to use file provenance to find
files placed in arbitrary locations. They were able to discover the relationship between files
and processes by examining their location relative to one another, and the frequency with
which they were accessed. This provenance data is fed into a machine learning algorithm
that classifies the files by semantic attributes, including file extensions, through prediction.
The results of the study showed that it was possible to predict the extension of a file based
on its provenance data.
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Data organization and presentation is an important part of the forensic process that
greatly expedite or debilitate data gathering depending on how well it is implemented. One
important facet of data presentation is the ability to generate a report on the information
that is present. Pyflag has the ability to provide automated reporting due to the higher level
analysis and extraction abilities provided by its scripting language, PyFlash [11]. This tool
has already proven very capable, as it was the primary tool used in the Digital Forensics
Research Conference (DFRWS) Forensic challenges in 2007 and 2008.
A more clear and concise view of relevant data makes is easier for specialists to quickly
parse through information that aids in their investigations. Reduced workload for examiners,
as well as more parsable information means that relevant evidence is found quickly. The
FACE tool[7] does just this, as it does a better job of presenting the forensic data than
most tools that are currently available. Its primary focus is correlating forensic data on the
file-system with data within the memory, as well as the network capture. The ability to
correlate data within the computer to information transmitted over the network is crucial,
as it is easy to spoof source information, such as a MAC address. It also helps to prove that
the computer the file was found on was indeed the original source of the file and not simply
a recipient.
Ramparser, a tool for linux memory analysis is built to feed directly into FACE. It adds a
number of features that were not available in automated forensics before the development of
this tool. These include additional process functions such as identifying running processes,
and how they were interacting with the stack. Ramparser also allows for identifying files
that were open at the time of the image capture, as well as libraries that were shared. Lastly,
it automatically collects information related to open sockets, and the related protocols that
are being used to transmit data on those sockets.
Time lines are another visualization aid that make it easier for forensic analysts to understand what is happening on a system. It is possible to create time lines by hand; however,
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it is far more efficient to have software available that automates the creation of these time
lines. The advent of time line software began with a tool called Zeitline [3] in 2005. The
purpose of Zeitline is to better organize the data present on a dead image. Encase, TSK,
and FTK already gather this information, but the creator of Zeitline argues that it is not
presented in a fashion that is useful for determining a sequence of events. Zeitline attempts
to solve this by allowing examiners to import events, which are then grouped, filtered, and
presented in a manner more indicative of a time line or sequence. log2timeline expands on
Zeitline’s functionality
Log2timeline is currently the most commonly used timelining tool, along with its powerful
backend, Plaso. Plaso comes with 5 tools that are useful in forensic analysis. The first,
image export, is useful for exporting file content from an image. It does this based on search
criteria provided by the user, simplifying the image search process. The next tool it contains
is log2timeline, which is the primary time line visualization aid. The third is called “pinfo”,
and it allows the user to get info from a plaso storage file, created by log2timeline.
Plaso files contain information on: when and how the tools was run, information gathered
during the pre-processing stage, metadata about each storage container or store, what parsers
were used during the extraction phase, parameters used, how many extracted events are in
the storage file, the count of each parser, if there are tagged events, what tag file was used,
what tags have been applied and count for each one, and if analysis plugins have been run,
an overview of which have been run and the content of the report. The fourth tool is “preg”,
and is used to parse registry information off of a windows image. The last tool, “psort”,
enables automatic analysis on plaso file contents as well as sorting and filtering.
The information provided by log2timeline still has extraneous and overwhelming data
that the examiner is not interested in. Due to this, any means of better organizing the data
present is a welcome improvement. The data is presented in CSV format, allowing the user
to open the document in excel to aid viewing; however, this does little to aid the informa19

tion inundation that the user is facing. A tool created by Derek Edwards called Tapestry
attempts to remedy the situation [9]. Tapestry organizes data by month, day, year, or hour
and hides extraneous data until the user wishes to expand upon it. This greatly helps with
the information overload that occurd with log2timeline. Beyond these basic capabilities, the
program also summarizes any changes in MACB records, which show access, modification,
ownership, and creation times. This makes it easy to see any interesting behavior, such as
file modification or movement. The program enables the user to create custom highlighted
groups based on system activities such as USB mounting. These highlighted groups simplify parsing the information at hand for related actions. To top things off, Tapestry even
summarizes the activities occurring within these groups.

2.6

Summary

A file’s provenance is its history. This consists of the various users who owned the
file, the times at which various interactions occurred, and the methods used to facilitate
ownership and interaction with the file. Ownership and interaction with the file have a
direct relationship. If a user edits the file, they now have ownership of it. An examiner
interested in a file’s provenance is interested in all of the ownership inducing interactions a
file experiences, as well as more nuanced interactions such as simply transmitting or opening
the file. This information is useful for facilitating anything from criminal investigations to
the scientific process.
There are several sources of provenance data. The most common source associated with
provenance is a file’s metadata. Information is also available in the system registry, the
various browser’s installed on a system that the file was found on or traveled through, and
proxies and firewalls. A number of tools exist that enable the retrieval of this information.
FTK, TSK, and EnCase enable the mounting and creation of images, as well as data retrieval.
log2timeline collects time stamped information from throughout the system, and aggregates
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it into a manageable format. Exiftool pulls the metadata from files. RegRipper and its
associated plugins allow users to easily access information within an image’s registry. NirSoft
provides a suite of tools that extract the history from browsers. Through combining these
tools, an examiner is able to rebuild the provenance of a file.
The most commonly employed provenance tracking programs are File Provenance Maintenance Systems. These systems rely on live tracking of a system’s activities. They record
any interactions with the files on the system, building a thorough provenance record for all
the files contained within. Due to their reliance on live tracking, as well as their dependence
on the system’s memory, they are not useful for rebuilding provenance for files located on
a system image. Many tools available today automate forensic processes, but none of them
enable the automated extraction of provenance from a dead source.
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3.

Digital Forensics File Provenance Generation

This section first describes AutoProv in broad terms, giving the reader an overall idea
of its structure. Following that, it provides a more technical and in depth explanation of
the software. This begins with the overall structure of each major piece of software used
in the design: DataGather.py, and DataProcess.py, both written in python. Within each of
these sections, the overview elaborates on specific pieces of data and the processes involved
in gathering and parsing them.

3.1

Overview

There are many tools currently available to aid examiners in determining activity within
system images. This software simplifies analysis by gathering information for the examiner,
and providing it in a useful and readable format. Unfortunately, there are no software
packages that automate the process of using these tools to aid the examiner in determining
where a file has come from, and what activity is directly related to the file. This thesis
presents a proof of concept tool that provides an initial prognosis of what enabled the file to
arrive on the system as well as partial activity of the file post arrival. The software details
the reasoning behind these provenance theories to the examiner, along with all of the tool
outputs leading to this conclusion. The examiner is then able to use this information to
determine where they should look further to verify the findings of the software.
The AutoProv system, shown in Figure 2, first runs a suite of tools in different configurations, and outputs the results of these iterations into text files. A folder encapsulates these
text files, using sub-folders for information that pertains to particular users found within
the image. Once these tools are run, by executing DataGather.py and providing it with
the image and file of interest, DataGather.py creates the folder for later use. The examiner
then runs DataProcess.py on the folder DataGather.py creates. DataProcess.py looks at all
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of the data within this folder, and attempts to determine the origins of the file of interest
within the image. It accomplishes this by looking for indicators that an examiner often uses
to determine the origins of a file. These origins could include local creation, a web browser,
a USB drive, etc. The software informs the user of the indicators present, and they draw
their own conclusions and determine how to best tailor their analysis from that point on.
DataProcess.py inserts relevant pieces of this information into time line format to aid the
examiner in prioritizing data analysis. The examiner then verifies this information by looking at the data DataGather.py provides, as well as whatever other sources are necessary for
verification purposes.
In order to facilitate the readability of the software, both DataGather.py and DataProcess.py use a shared library called AutoLib.py. This library contains functions both DataGather.py and DataProcess.py use. The DataGather.py and DataProcess.py scripts are
primarily a series of function calls, and the utilization of those calls. This provides a general
functionality map to the reader. If the reader wishes to obtain a more in depth understanding of how the code is accomplishing its objectives, AutoLib.py contains the details of what
each of the functions is doing.
The output this software provides is correct the majority of the time, as long as the
necessary data is salvageable from the dead image. For example, if the Created Date is not
salvageable from the metadata of a file, this affects the accuracy of this software’s prediction.
In this situation, more analysis by the examiner is necessary to verify the results. If enough
pieces of data are missing, the software’s output is not representative of the actual origins of
the file. This tool is meant to be an aid, not a substitute for an examiner. Figure 2 provides
a summary of the structure of AutoProv.
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Figure 2: AutoProv Project Structure

3.2

Data Gathering (DataGather.py)

The data gathering component of this software occurs within one script: DataGather.py.
The purpose of this script is to automate the many tedious tasks the examiner must often
undergo when attempting to determine the provenance of a file. It also ensures that all of
the data gathered is in a directory format that DataProcess.py is expecting, and therefore
able to process and use effectively.
The various different software iterations result in different granularities of time data.
Some of the results are within microseconds, while others are days apart. A summary of this
information is available in Table 2.
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Table 2: Temporal Granularity
Target
Registry last modified times
Recent Documents
File MAC times
History Entries
USB Key
User/Group Information
CurrentVersion subkey

Source
NTUSER.dat
NTUSER.dat
File of Interest
Browser History Files
SYSTEM
SAM
SOFTWARE

Granularity
microseconds
> days
seconds
seconds
seconds
seconds
seconds

After installing the required software and making the recommended path configuration
modifications, the examiner need only supply the script with the location of the image, along
with the name of the file of interest. At this point, the Data Gathering software mounts
the image locally as a read only drive. DataGather.py mounts the image as read only, to
ensure that neither the software nor the examiner accidentally modify any of the data/files
present on the image. Ensuring the mounted image is read only also prevents any changes
to last accessed times. This helps maintain the validity of the results for use in a court room
setting.
To mount the image, the Data Gathering software needs to know the start block of the
image of interest. It obtains this information by running mmls on the image, and routing
the output to a text file. The text file is then parsed to find the start block of the first
NTFS partition within the image. Simply looking for the string “NTFS” within a line in the
mmls output allows the program to find the start block of the NTFS partition. DataGather
also ensures that a start block for an NTFS partition has not already been found, as this
would result in that partition’s start block being overwritten with the second partition’s
start block. The first partition is the one of interest, as this contains the registry hives and
user directories. DataGather assumes the block size is 512, as this is almost always the case
by tradition. Once this information is gathered, the “mount” command is used to locally
mount the image.
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Once the image is mounted, DataGather then determine the location of the file of interest.
In order to accomplish this, the find command is run on the image folder (the place where the
image was mounted). The results are stored in a variable, which is then read and stripped of
white space. The file’s name and location are then stored within a text document for later
use by DataProcess.
After discovering the location of the file, DataGather.py obtains the operating system
version and installation date. This is useful for tailoring tools to a specific operating system version. It also allows the examiner to know that a file’s creation date is completely
out of scope for having possibly been created on the image it is residing on. This is accomplished using the winver plugin for RegRipper . The data of interest is contained
within the SOFTWARE hive. While winver does contain the operating system version,
DataGather.py simply looks at the directory structure leading to the SOFTWARE hive.
Based on this directory structure, it is able to determine what version of Windows is running. If the structure looks like: %SystemRoot%/System32/config/SOFTWARE, then
the software knows it is dealing with a Windows 7 or later operating system. On the other
hand, a structure of %SystemRoot%/system32/config/software means it is dealing
with Windows XP. The boolean variables representing Windows 7 and beyond, and Windows
XP, are set to true or false depending on the operating system version, in order to properly
direct other programs that interact with the registry.
With the location of the file itself ascertained, the program seeks to determine if there
might be a torrent version of the file. Whenever a user downloads a file using torrenting
software, the user must first download a torrent file, which aids the torrenting software in
determining how to download the file of interest. This torrenting file is usually just the name
of the file with “.torrent” attached to the end. For example, if we were torrenting a picture
named “flowers.jpg”, the torrent file would be called “flowers.jpg.torrent”. Therefore, in
order to determine if a torrent file related to the file of interest is present on the system, all
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that DataGather.py needs to do is run the find command on the file of interest’s name, with
“.torrent” appended to the end. If a file is found, then there is a very high probability that
the source of the file was torrenting software such as FrostWire.
One of the most useful sources of file provenance information is a file’s meta data. This is
the next piece of information DataGather obtains. The exiftool software accomplishes this,
as it is able to glean metadata from nearly any file type, if that information is available.
Therefore, all DataGather needs to do to obtain the metadata is to run exiftool on the file
of interest. This information is routed to a text file for later use by DataProcess.
After obtaining the file’s metadata, DataGather pulls the dates and times relative to
the times the file was interacted with on the system. This information is contained within
the ctime atime and mtime [17]. These dates/times are compared by the processing
script to gain a great deal of information about the file, and it is therefore important to pass
this information along. To gather this information, the gather script simply runs the “stat”
command on the file, and outputs the results to a text file. The results are in an easily
parsed format, clearly labeling the information of interest.
Now that the metadata has been captured, we are interested in obtaining the last write
times of any registry keys that may be useful, as well as any pertaining values. This is done
using log2timeline, along with various filters. The filters are used to restrict log2timeline,
preventing it from analyzing the entire image. While this does reduce the information
available to DataProcess.py, it is necessary to greatly reduce the time necessary to analyze
an image. The majority of information relevant to the provenance of a file is found within
%USERPROFILE%/NTUSER.dat, as well as the various folders and sub-folders within
the Application Data folder (%APPDATA%), and the folders and sub-folders within Local
Settings, so not much, if anything, is lost due to this restriction.
Each user’s NTUSER.dat file contains a plethora of data showing their activities on the
system. The application data and local settings folders contain a variety of user specific
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settings and configuration files. These often contain information on when file’s are accessed
by various executables within the system. Due to the file structure being different on modern
machines (Windows 7+) than it is on Windows xp, the filter contains accommodations for
the different operating system file structures in the form of “or” statements, to ensure that
log2timeline is directed to the correct location.
It is also important for the examiner, as well as the tools being used, to be aware of all
the users present on a system. DataGather either checks the Users folder or the Documents
and Settings folder, depending on the version of Windows, to determine what users are
present on the system. The program is not interested in the default users that are present
on all systems, so those users are filtered out along with unrelated directories. This includes:
“All Users”, “desktop.ini”, “Default”, “Default User”, “Local Service”, “NetworkService”
and “Public”. Once this list of users is placed within an array structure, all of the users of
interest are printed to a text document so that DataProcess is aware of their presence.
In order to better separate information as it pertains to each user on a system, each user
is given their own sub directory within the overarching directory dedicated to each iteration
of DataGather. The first thing that is placed into each of these user directories after they
are generated is the documents and drives they have most recently interacted with. This
is accomplished using the RegRipper plug in: recentdocs tln. This plugin is run on the
NTUSER file of each user present on the system.
The next thing DataGather obtains is the system’s USB connection history. This information includes the first date/time that the system interfaced with the USB device, the
most recent time the system interfaced with the USB device, and the serial number of the
device. The date’s and times of the various USB connections are valuable for determining
whether or not a USB device was the source of the file of interest. Especially in situations
where the file is malicious, if a USB device is the file source, additional usage won’t occur.
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the last connection date of the USB device would
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be reasonably close to the date that the file was first seen on the system. This information is obtained using the usbdevices plugin for RegRipper . It is contained within the
%SystemRoot%/System32/config/SYSTEM hive.
Another highly important piece of information gathered from the system is the user
and group data. This data includes when each user account and group were created, the
respective permissions of each of those entities, as well as the last time each user logged into
the system. This information is highly valuable when attempting to find who allowed the file
to get to its current location, and how it originally arrived on the system. The information is
gathered by running the RegRipper samparse plugin on the SAM hive of the registry.
An important piece of information to facilitate the parsing of the log2timeline logs is the
timezone that the image uses. log2timeline gathers information in GMT/UCT, while some
other sources of forensic information are relative to the system time. In order to correct
this imbalance, the timezone that the system was in prior to the image being taken must be
known. Luckily, RegRipper has a plugin that looks inside of the SYSTEM registry hive in
order to find this information. Therefore all DataGather must do is run the timezone plugin on the SYSTEM hive, and output the results to timezone.txt, and DataProcess handles
the rest.

3.2.1

Browser History

The next item of interest is the user’s web history. File’s are commonly downloaded from
web pages, and therefore it is important look at the various web pages a user has visited.
DataGather begins by processing Chrome’s history. This is done using a piece of software
aptly named “ChromeHistoryView” [26]. DataGather locates the chrome history file, assuming it is in its default location, and provides it to ChromeHistoryView. ChromeHistoryView
is designed to be run on the Windows OS, so Wine is used to allow it to run in the Linux
environment. The output of this program is pushed into a text file for later use by DataPro29

cess. Similar methods using various Nirsoft tools allow for the attainment of the rest of the
various browsers’ history data.
The Nirsoft browser history extraction tools work exceptionally well for the majority of
browsers. Unfortunately, their Firefox history extraction tool, MZHistoryView [27], did not
perform as well as was necessary for the successful implementation of this thesis. For this
reason, a Firefox history extracting python library was added to the scope of this thesis. The
library uses SQL calls to navigate through the various tables present within the places.sqlite
file that contains Firefox’s user history for versions 3 and beyond. There are two tables within
places.sqlite that are of interest to this thesis, for the purposes of extracting a sequential
history of the user’s browsing. These are the moz historyvisits and moz places tables, which
have the structure shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Fire Fox Table Relationship
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the two tables of interest within places.sqlite.
There are many more tables within this database, but these are the primary two of relevance.
Moz historyvisits contains the sequential Firefox history of the user. The actual websites
they visited are encoded as a place id. This place id is used as a reference to an entry within
moz places that contains the url of website visited. The moz historyvisits table also contains
the full date and time of the visit. This information is encoded in epoch format [10].
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FFhistory.py converts this information into a array of history ojects that contain the
address visited, the date of the visit, and the time of the visit. This is accomplished using
the sqlite3 python library, which allows python to make SQL calls to an SQL table. The
SELECT command is used to pull all of the information off both tables, which is returned
in array format. The information of interest is then pulled using simple calls to the portions
of the array that are of interest. Once the date/time of the entry is obtained in epoch
format, the time library is able to convert it into GMT, a much more useful format. The
various entries within moz places are searched for each of the relevant indexes found within
moz historyvisits, and the addresses discovered are added to the relevant entries. By the
time all of the entries found within moz historyvisits are accounted for, the program has
produced a full browsing history based on the user’s places.sqlite database file.

3.3

Data Processing (DataProcess.py)

The data processing script receives all of the information it needs from a folder created by
the data gathering script. Figure 4 shows this relationship. Once the data gathering script
has run, all the examiner needs to do is execute the data processing script on the folder
that was created by the gathering script. Once the script is done analyzing the various
tool outputs produced by DataGather.py, it outputs any correlations as well as a time line
showing many relevant events that helped determine their validity.
There are a number of boolean variables that DataProcess.py uses to track correlations
it wishes to inform the user of. These variables and their meaning are overwhelming, so a
summary is available at the end of the section. The time line is built using a doubly linked
list. The nodes within the list are a class structure called an event. The event structure
contains the year, month, and day of the time line entry. It also contains the hour, minute,
and second of the event’s occurrence. Any further granularity is removed from the event.
Lastly it contains the description, which is the message printed to represent the event, and
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Figure 4: Output Directory Structure
pointers to the next and previous event nodes.
The first thing that the data processing script does, is open up the text file namelocation.txt, provided by data gather, that contains the file of interest’s name and location. It
then parses the contents of this file into two respective variables, filename and location, for
later use.
The program also checks namelocation file to determine if a torrent version of the file
exists on the system. If a torrent file exists, DataGather places the location of the file inside
of the namelocation.txt file for the purpose of convenience in parsing. If a torrent file is not
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found, then the third line of the namelocation text file is empty.
Next, the script opens the text file, meta.txt, containing the metadata of the file. This
data is more difficult to parse, as the format is not always predictable. Based on the data
that exiftool is able to find, it changes the output it produces. Therefore, instead of simply
going line by line through the text file, the parse meta function looks for specific strings
within each line that are indicators that the information is present. Each line is stripped of
extraneous blank space, and then split using colons as the parameter. This leaves a number
of extraneous entries in the resulting array, which are removed. The function is then free to
look for the strings “Creator”, “Last Modified By”, and “Create Date”.
Through locating these strings, the function detects that some piece of the information
of interest is present in the line. More blank space is stripped away from this line of value
and it is split using the space character as a modifier. Unnecessary characters are removed.
DataGather.py retrieves individual values of interest from the resulting array. It modifies
any dates and times into a standard format used for comparison purposes with the dates and
times produced by other tools. The format used for dates is year:month:day and the format
for time is hours:minutes:seconds, with any extraneous zeros removed. For example, if a
minutes value is represented by “05” minutes, it becomes “5” minutes for ease of comparison
and casting to integers. With the metadata parsed, the script is free to determine if the
file’s creator is the same user who edited the file. If this information is available, and the
values are different, then it is known that a different user modified the file than the user who
created the file. This information is reported to the user.
The file’s date of creation as well as the date of modification, are valuable for the time
line this tool produces. At this point, the tool takes the information from the metadata, and
parses it into the generic Event class structure format, enabling its addition as a node to the
linked list time line. A function within AutoLib.py, insertEvent, takes care of adding these
nodes chronologically to the time line.
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When nodes are added to the time line, insertion must occur at the proper position within
the linked list structure. The insertEvent function accomplishes this by first checking if the
list has a head node. If there is no head node, the new entry becomes the head of the list.
Otherwise, the function iteratively checks whether each event in the list is greater than the
new event. The isGreater function accomplishes this comparison by iterating through the
values within the event structure, starting with year and ending with seconds, to determine
which date and time is more recent. If the new event’s date and time is greater, then the
function places it after the current comparison node, and the isGreater function returns true
allowing this to take place. If isGreater is true, the function checks the next node in the
same manner as the previous one unless there is no next node. If there is no next node, the
new node becomes the tail end of the list.
If the new node occurs before the node with which it is compared, then it is inserted
before the comparison node. To accomplish this, the “next” pointer of the node before the
current comparison node points at the new node, and the comparison node’s “prev”, for
previous, pointer also points at the new node. The new node’s prev and next pointers then
point at these two nodes respectively. Using this insertion criteria, a chronological time line
of events forms. Figures 5 and 6 show how this insertion method works.
Now that the metadata and the basic location information of the file are obtained, more
detailed system information is desired. In order to obtain this information, DataProcess
looks to the wininfo.txt file. As mentioned in the Data Gathering section, this file contains
information on what type of operating system we are dealing with, as well as the date that
the operating system was installed. DataProcess parses this file by calling the parseWinInfo
function from the AutoLib library. This function grabs the information of interest, and
reformats it to the same format as the other date/time values it is compared to.
First the function replaces the months with their respective numbers. For example,
‘Jan’ must be replaced with the number 1. The function uses a dictionary to accomplish
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Figure 5: Time Line Insertions
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Oldest Entry

Middle Entry

Figure 6: Time Line Insertions Continued
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this. The three pieces of information the function pulls from the file is the “ProductName”,
which is the version of windows, the “CSDVersion”, this is the last update applied, and the
InstallDate, which is self-explanatory. This information is all stored within a WindowsInfo
class structure, so that the information of interest is easily pulled whenever necessary.
Now that we have the metadata for the file, we look to see what users are present on
the system. This information is held within the users.txt file generated by DataGather.
DataGather has already done the majority of the work for us here, so all that is necessary
is to iterate through the list of users, stripping off the new line character and placing each
user name into an array. The first thing we use these user-names for is to determine if any
of the users on this system are the user present in the “created by” section of the metadata.
If this is true, a boolean is set that ensures the examiner is aware of this correlation.
The next items of interest are the ctime, mtime, and atime. This information is
already present in timestamps.txt, thanks to DataGather. DataProcess pulls this information from the text file, and places it into the Timestamp class structure so that relevant
information is easily available. Once again, the structure of the timestamps require alteration so that they match those of the other software in use. The parsetimestamps function
within AutoLib does the heavy lifting here, with assistance from the timestampfix function.
parsetimestamps searches for relevant strings that let the software know the information of
interest is present, while timestampfix alters the times and dates found so that they are
comparable to the times and dates presented by the other software in use. This, once again,
requires replacing characters, removing blank space, and removing extraneous zeros from
the minutes and seconds fields. The ctime is added to the time line as a reference point
to show the user the file’s creation date/time within the greater context of other relevant
events.
AutoProv then examines the time line that DataGather provides from the output of
log2timeline run with a filter pointing it at NTUSER.dat, as well as various application
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folders, for the various users. Each user has their own set of directories/hives of interest. The
DataGather script uses a filter for log2timeline that checks every user’s useful structures, and
outputs the results to a consolidated text file. Therefore, in order to find anything relevant
within all of these entities, the script need only look within one text file. DataProcess looks
for any entries that involve the file of interest within the generated text file, and appends
them to an array of “relevant entries”.
Whenever a relevant entry is found, its details are placed within an iteration of the time
lineEntry class. This class structure provides the date of the entry, the time of the entry, and
many other descriptive elements generated by log2timeline. log2timeline’s output facilitates
this, as it is in CSV format. Therefore, the script need only separate the values by comma,
and strip away any excess characters, in order to populate the time lineEntry class values.
The first relevant entry is then added to the time line that is provided to the user, so that
the user sees when the file first arrived on the system within the greater context of the other
relevant events.
Following the discovery of all relevant time line entries, DataProcess checks to see if
any of them contain references to program executions on the day of the file’s first arrival on
system. This is done by looking for the first relevant time line entry that involves the file, and
comparing the data of its occurrence to all time line entries that involve program executions.
Program executions are discovered by looking for references to the userassist registry within
the NTUSER registry in the time line report. The userassist logs are updated whenever a
program execution occurs, making it possible to find program executions within a relevant
time span. After finding all program executions that occur within the day of the file’s
arrival, DataProcess then narrows its criteria to programs executed within six hours of the
file’s arrival. The time line entries referencing these program executions, and the user’s who
executed the programs, are pulled and parsed into entries which are then inserted into the
time line created by DataProcess.
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This process is repeated for any program executions in close proximity to the file’s modification time. This is important, as the file may have been modified within the system. If
the file was modified within the system, any program executions that may have enabled the
modification of the file become an important part of that file’s provenance
The next step the script takes is to search for when software of interest was run by the
user. The first software it checks for is FrostWire. FrostWire is a torrenting platform that
is used to obtain files, and therefore it is within the scope of file provenance investigation.
There are many other torrenting platforms, but for the purposes of this proof of concept,
only FrostWire is detectable. Once again, the log2timeline results are used to determine if
or when the software was run.
Within the log2timeline results, references to the userassist hive [31] show that the user
ran specific software. Knowing this, the script need only look for a line containing a reference
to “Frostwire.exe”, as well as “winreg/userassist” to determine that the time line entry is
a reference to the user running FrostWire at a particular date and time. The script then
populates an array containing all entries that involve a FrostWire execution. We now know
every occurrence of a user executing FrostWire.
These iterations of FrostWire executions are only valuable within the context of the file’s
arrival on the system. To determine if a FrostWire execution is of value, the DataProcess.py
script checks if any of the executions occurred on the date of the file’s arrival. If they did,
then a relevant boolean variable is set to true, and the event is added to the time line in the
usual manner, further adding to the user’s understanding of the file’s method of arrival.
Another commonly used application for file transfers is Skype. Skype allows two individuals to call one another, and also transfer file’s during the conversation if they wish to do
so. For this reason, DataProcess.py checks for Skype executions in the same way it checks
for FrostWire executions. It looks for “Skype.exe” and “winreg/userassist” in the same line
of the time line file. If it finds a situation where this is true, it logs the date and time of the
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event. It then compares the date and time of the Skype execution to the file of interest’s
arrival data. If the dates match, a flag is activated. If the events are within thirty minutes
of one another, another flag is activated, further refining the possibility of the file’s arrival
via means of Skype.
This proof of concept focuses mostly on the provenance of Microsoft Word documents.
For this reason, it is important to note the activity of Microsoft Word. Similar to Skype
and FrostWire, executions of WINWORD.EXE found inside the userassist subhive help
determine when Word executions occur. Word executions are once again correlated with the
arrival of the file; however, Word also allows users to create and edit files as well. For this
reason, Word executions are also compared to the creation date found within the metadata,
if a creation date is available. Separate flags are activated depending on whether the file
arrived on the same date as a word execution, or if it was created on the date of the word
execution.
The software also checks for the string “Microsoft/Office” within the display name of
each time line entry. Within Windows XP, any uses of Microsoft office products contain
this string. This helps with determining who interacted with the file of interest, and when
they did so. The string “Removable Disk” is also checked for within the message portion
of each relevant time line entry, as this highlights USB usage within close proximity to the
file’s arrival. This happens when the USB device and the file of interest both appear in the
user’s recently used documents.
Another important string to check for in the message section of relevant time line entries
is “Content.IE5”. This string existing in the message portion of a relevant entry means that
a time line entry that references the file of interest, also references the content.IE5 folder,
meaning that a reference to the file was found within this folder. This reference occurs due
to the file being acquired using Internet Explorer, and based on the results discussed on the
next chapter, it also appears to result from file’s being acquired using Safari on Windows
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operating systems. This immediately and greatly narrows the possible sources of the file of
interest.
Besides knowing what happened to a file, it is important to know who caused the various
actions to occur. For this reason, DataProcess also checks what users interacted with the
file of interest. This is accomplished by searching the relevant time line entries for any
references to a user that is known to exist on the system. If the user name is found within
the display name portion of the entry, and the user has not already been discovered, then
the user name is appended to the list of users who have interacted with the file of interest.
It is also important to determine whether or not it is feasible for the file to have been
created locally. If the creation date of the file is available within its metadata, the program
compares this date to the installation date of the operating system, obtained by DataGather.py using RegRipper. If the installation date of the operating system is beyond
the creation date of the file, there is no way that the file was created on the system, and
therefore it must have been obtained via some other means. DataProcess.py also compares
the creation date of the file to the first time the file is seen within the system of interest.
If the creation time is within 30 minutes of the file’s arrival on system, this is reported as
this has a high correlation with the file having been locally created. This information helps
drastically reduce the user’s investigation efforts for rebuilding the file’s provenance.
Next, DataProcess.py looks more into determining which users interacted with the file of
interest. The program already obtained a list of users that are referenced within the output of
log2timeline in conjunction with the file of interest. This has a high likelihood of accurately
predicting who has interacted with the file. In order to further reinforce this knowledge,
DataProcess.py looks at each user’s recent interactions, as obtained by DataGather.py using
RegRipper. If any of the recent interactions reference the file of interest, this information
is reported to the user. This serves the purpose of further solidifying the validity of known
information.
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Another valuable piece of information for determining the source of the file of interest is
the data on various USB connections within the system. This information was pulled via
RegRipper by DataGather.py. DataProcess.py takes this raw text information, and parses
it into a USB class structure. The date and time of the USB’s last connection, as well as its
serial number and device identifier are all obtained and parsed into an easily referenceable
class format. If any of these USB devices were connected on the day that the file arrived,
a correlation boolean is activated, and this information is reported to the user. The date
and time of the USB connection is also added to the time line in order to better put this
information in perspective.
DataProcess.py now attempts to further identify what users have knowledge of the file’s
presence on the system, and may know more about how it arrived. This is determined by
looking at what users were logged into the system on the day that the file first arrived. This
information is obtained from the user and groups information pulled from the SAM hive by
DataProcess.py using RegRipper . The date that each user last logged in is compared to
the date of the file’s arrival on system. If the dates are a match, an entry is added to the
time line and the user is appended to an array of users reported at the end of the program’s
execution.
The next section of DataProcess.py focuses on pulling all of the relevant web history
off of the image of interest. It starts by checking if DataGather.py was able to pull each
user’s chrome history from the image. For each user that has available chrome history, each
entry within their history is parsed into a class structure. Those class structures are then
appended to an array of chrome history entry class structures. A similar method is used to
pull any Internet Explorer history that is available for the system’s user’s. Nirsoft’s Internet
Explorer history viewer also pulls all of the various windows explorer interactions for each
user as well, which helps with rebuilding the file’s provenance. Each of these class structures
is appended to an array.
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Once the various internet history sources are parsed into class structures, the relevancy
of the individual entries must be confirmed. In order to accomplish this, DataProcess.py
splits the time of the first entry referring to the file of interest, and pulls out the hour of
its occurrence. The program uses this value to narrow the list of web visits to within two
hours of the file’s arrival. This helps to ensure that the browsing history the user is viewing
is relevant to the file’s provenance. The program accomplishes this for each browser type
sequentially, adding the relevant entries to the time line for later output.

3.3.1

Outputs

After all of this information is gathered, DataProcess.py begins outputting it in a user
readable format. The first items of interest provided to the user are the correlations. All
correlation flags are attributed to a meaning, summarized at the end of this section. The
basic meaning of these correlations is conveyed to the user via a string output that highlights
the occurrence of these items of interest. Arrays that are used as truth indicators lead
to additional lines of output for the various users within the system. Once these boolean
correlations are resolved, the program provides the user with the time line created throughout
the various information filtering that took place earlier in the program’s execution. This time
line is referenced when the user wants clarification on the presented correlations, or when
additional information is necessary to acquire accurate file provenance. The correlations
presented to the user consist of several categories, shown in Figure 7.
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Boolean Correlation Variables
The code example below each variable is simplified psuedo-code, and not the exact code
used to activate the corresponding boolean.

Figure 7: Correlation Categories

difmod
if metadata.creator != metadata.modifier:
difmod = True
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recentuser
for user in userlist:
recent = recentdocs\_tln output
for line in recent:
if filename in line:
recentuser.append(user)
date check
if time line_entry.contains(filename):
relevant_entries.append(entry)
for entry in relevant_entries:
if entry.date == metadata.created_date:
date_check = True
time check
crtime = metadata.created_time
if time line_entry.contains(filename):
releveant_entries.append(entry)
for entry in relevant_entries:
if date_check:
if (entry.time > crtime - 30 minutes) and
(entry.time < crtime + 30 minutes):
time_check = True
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systemuser
for user in userlist:
if (metadata.creator == user) or (metadata.author == user):
systemuser = True
word create day
if time line_entry.contains("WINWORD.EXE"):
word_entries.append(entry)
for entry in word_entries:
if entry.date == metadata.created_date:
word_create_date = True
word appear day
if time line_entry.contains("WINWORD.EXE"):
word_entries.append(entry)
for entry in word_entries:
if entry.date == file_arrival_date:
word_appear_date = True
word modify day
if time line_entry.contains("WINWORD.EXE"):
word_entries.append(entry)
for entry in word_entries:
if entry.date == metadata.modification_date:
word_modify_date = True
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officeinteract
if time line_entry.contains(filename):
relevant_entries.append(entry)
for entry in relevant_entries:
if entry.contains("Microsoft/Office"):
officeinteract = True
impossiblelocal
windows_info = winver output
windows_install_date = windows_info.install_date
if windows_install_date > created_date:
impossiblelocal = True
editing
if mtime > file_arrival_date:
editing = True
timelinerelevant removable disk usage
if time line_entry.contains(filename):
relevant_entries.append(entry)
for entry in relevant_entries:
if entry.contains("Removable Disk"):
time linerelevant\_removable\_disk\_usage = True
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usbdatematch
devices = usbdevices output
for device in devices:
if device.last_write_date == file_arrival_date:
usbdatematch = True
torrentfile
if filename + ".torrent" on system:
torrentfile = True
fwiredatematch
if time line_entry.contains("FrostWire.exe" and
"winreg/userassist"):
frostwire_entries.append(entry)
for entry in frostwire_entries:
if entry.date == file_arrival_date:
fwiredatematch = True
skypedatematch
if time line_entry.contains("Skype.exe" and "winreg/userassist"):
frostwire_entries.append(entry)
for entry in frostwire_entries:
if entry.date == file_arrival_date:
skypedatematch = True
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skype30min
if time line_entry.contains("Skype.exe" and "winreg/userassist"):
frostwire_entries.append(entry)
for entry in frostwire_entries:
if date_check:
if (entry.time > arrival - 30 minutes) and
(entry.time < arrival + 30 minutes):
time_check = True
samedaylogin
users = samparse output
for user in users:
if user.last_login_date == file_arrival_date:
samedaylogin = True
relevant chrome visits
chrome_visits = ChromeHistoryView output
for link in chrome_visits:
if link.visit_date == arrival_date:
if (link.visit_time > arrival - 2hrs) and
(link.visit_time < arrival + 2hrs):
relevant_chrome_visits.append(link)
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relevant ie visits
ie_visits = IEHistoryView output
for link in ie_visits:
if link.visit_date == arrival_date:
if (link.visit_time > arrival - 2hrs) and
(link.visit_time < arrival + 2hrs):
relevant_ie_visits.append(link)
relevant ff visits
ff_visits = FFhistory results
for link in ff_visits:
if link.visit_date == arrival_date:
if (link.visit_time > arrival - 2hrs) and
(link.visit_time < arrival + 2hrs):
relevant_ff_visits.append(link)
userinteract
if time line_entry.contains(filename):
relevant_entries.append(entry)
for entry in relevant_entries:
for user in users:
if entry.contains(user.display_name) and
userinteract.append(user)
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(not userinteract):

systemuser
for user in users:
if (metadata.creator == user.display_name) or
(metadata.author == user.display_name):
systemuser = True
systemmod
for user in users:
if metadata.modfier == user.display_name:
systemmod = True
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4.

Experimental Results

Two sets of tests validate the functionality of AutoProv’s ability to recreate provenance on
an image. The first tests, Use Case tests, run through a set of manually generated scenarios.
The second set of tests involve images where the provenance of the file’s are unknown prior
to running the AutoProv scripts. The tool set is run, and then the results are analyzed to
determine there efficacy. The time zone of all dates and time referenced is GMT.

4.1

Use Case Testing

The first set of tests involve a system that is reset to a known good snapshot between tests.
During each test, the user takes deliberate actions that the software adequately responds
to. These tests successfully test the core functionality of AutoProv, without introducing the
unexpected. The time line functionality was not yet implemented as of these tests.

4.1.1

Use Cases

Each use case involves a Windows 7 Service Pack 2, 64 bit, VMWare Virtual Machine
with Google Chrome v. 51, Firefox v. 46, FrostWire v. 1.7.3, Microsoft Office 2016, and
Skype v. 7.25 installed. The six use cases are:
1. A user logs on, creates a Microsoft Word (MW) document, and logs off. Another user
then logs in, edit, and saves the document.
2. A MW document is copy-pasted to the system via NTFS format USB removable drive.
A user on the system then edits and saves the MW document.
3. The user calls someone on Skype, and receives a MW document from them. The file
is then moved.
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4. The user torrents a MW document using FrostWire, and then edits the MW document.
5. A user downloads a MW document via Chrome, and then edits it.
6. Downloads a MW document using Internet Explorer, and then edits the document.
4.1.2

Use Case Results

Use case one resulted in the following boolean flags:
– difmod - The file was modified by someone other than the creator.
– localuser - The file is in one or more user’s recent documents.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist referring to the file within thirty minutes
of its creation.
– systemuser - The file’s creator has the same user name as a user who exists on this
system.
– word create day - Microsoft Word is used, within the system, on the creation date
of the file.
– word appear day - Microsoft Word executes on the first day that this file is seen on
the computer.
– editing - This indicates possible file editing while on the system of interest.
From these flags, the examiner easily determines that the file was edited, and that the editing
most likely occurred locally. This is based on the editing and difmod flags, and supported by
the local user flag. In addition, the time check, systemuser, localuser, and word create day
flags show the file was locally created.

Use case two resulted in the following boolean flags:
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– usbdatematch - A removable disk is used on the same day that the file first arrived
on system.
– time linerelevant removable disk usage - This variable is set if a time line entry
references the file of interest, as well as a USB drive.
– word appear day - Microsoft word executes on the first day that this file is seen on
the computer.
– difmod - Creator and Modifier are different.
– samedaylogin - User’s last logged in on day of file’s arrival. Users are listed.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
The usbdatematch and time linerelevant removable disk usage combine to show that the file
could have originated from a USB device. The word appear day and difmod flags then show
that the file was most likely modified after arrival, using Microsoft Word. The samedaylogin
flag is active, which means that any users who logged in that day are listed, helping to narrow
down the user who connected the usb device. The time check flag is active due to testing,
as the file was quickly transferred after creation for the purposes of this test. Therefore, its
presence is ignored.

Use case three resulted in the following boolean flags:
– skypedatematch - Skype was used on the same day that the file first arrived on the
system.
– skype30min - Skype was used within 30 minutes of the file first being seen on system.
– samedaylogin - User’s last logged in on day of file’s arrival. Users are listed.
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For the third test, the skypedatematch and skype30min flags trigger to show that Skype is
used within 30 minutes of the file’s arrival. The samedaylogin then lists the user who was
logged in on the date the file arrived, helping the user to discover who allowed the file to
arrive on the system.

Use case four resulted in the following boolean flags:
– torrentfile - A torrent file exists that has the same name as the file of interest.
– fwiredatematch - FrostWire was used on the day that the file was first seen on the
system.
– difmod - The file was modified by someone other than the creator.
– editing - This indicates possible file editing while on the system of interest.
– samedaylogin - User’s last logged in on day of file’s arrival. Users are listed.
– impossiblelocal - The Operating System was installed on this system after the file
was created.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
– word appear day - Microsoft word executes on the first day that this file is seen on
the computer.
The fourth test works as expected, activating the torrentfile, and fwiredatematch flags
to show a possible torrent source. The combination of difmod, editing, time check, and
word appear day flags create a high likelihood of local editing. The user safely assumes none
of these flags were activated by the file’s creation due to the impossiblelocal flag’s activation.

55

Lastly, the impossible local creation flag activates. This lets the user know that the creation
date of the file is earlier than that of the operating system. This dramatically decreases the
likelihood of local creation.

Use cases five and six resulted in the following boolean flags:
– relevant chrome visits - This variable is true if there are any chrome visits within
+ − 2 hours of the file’s arrival on system.
– relevant ie visits - This variable is true if there are any Internet Explorer visits within
+ − 2 hours of the file’s arrival on system.
– difmod - The file was modified by someone other than the creator.
– editing - This indicates possible file editing while on the system of interest.
– samedaylogin - User’s last logged in on day of file’s arrival. Users are listed.
– impossiblelocal - The Operating System was installed on this system after the file
was created.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
The last two use cases have similar results, as they both test browser history parsing. The
relevant chrome visits and relevant ie visits flags are both active for their respective tests,
so the program provides the user with any web page visits within a two hour time span.
This provides users with insight into the source of the file, especially in this test, as the
file’s source web page contains the name of the file itself on the download mirror. The tool
presents the information in a readable single line format, allowing the examiner to easily
parse the results. The usual login (samedaylogin) and editing (difmod, editing) flags are
active as well, showing the user the file was modified locally.
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4.2

Real Data Corpus (RDC) Testing

This portion of the testing uses a series of relevant images from the Real Data Corpus
(RDC) [21]. The RDC consists of real world forensic data collected from devices purchased
on the secondary market throughout the world. After mounting the images and locating files
of interest, the data gathering and processing tools were used to recreate the provenance of
the files. User names are changed to a numerical standard in order to protect identities.
User enumerations are reset for different images (user 1 on image 1 is a different user than
user 1 on image 2). The time line portion of the project was complete at this point, allowing
for more complete provenance recreation.
DataGather.py uses correlations and filtering to reduce log2timeline’s output from an
average of several million events to fifteen events or less. This is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Time line Summary (Image 5: File 2)
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4.2.1

Results
Image 1: File 1

The following booleans are set to True in for the first file of interest, a .doc (Microsoft
Office) file, on image 1. Image 1 is a Microsoft Windows XP machine with Service Pack 1
installed.
– Creator not Modifier - Looking at the file’s metadata, the software sees that the
file’s creator is not the same user as the file’s modifier. This is not a boolean flag, but
the software still outputs this information. The modifier’s name is also provided.
File Modified: 2006:6:19 - 08:36
– datecheck - This boolean is false, as the creation date is not equivalent to the date
the file is first seen on system, resulting in the program noting that it is very unlikely
the file was created locally. The file’s creation date, and the date it is first seen are
both provided to the user.
Creation: 2006:6:8 - 06:34 // Arrival: 2006:6:20 - 11:41:38
– userinteract - A user, user 1, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2006:6:20 - 11:41:38
– officeinteract - Microsoft Word was used to interact with the file.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2006:6:20 - 11:41:38
– editing - The file appears to have either been edited or copied within the system due
its mtime being much different than its arrival time. The mtime is provided to the
user.
– ie5 content - References to the file exist within Internet Explorer’s Temporary Internet Files (TIF).
58

– The time line includes entries that are not within a time span that infers local creation.
Figure 9 shows a summary of the time line produced by DataProcess.py.

Figure 9: Time line Summary (Image 1: File 1)
Viewing the correlations determined by DataProcess.py, along with the time line is produces, it is fairly simple to recreate the provenance of this file. It is apparent based on the
datecheck flag that the file probably wasn’t created locally. Combining that with the fact
that there are references to the file within Internet Explorer’s content, it becomes clear that
the file was most likely downloaded. The file was edited at some point based on the creator
not being the modifier, but it probably didn’t happen on this system, as the most recent
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modifier is not a user on this system. The editing flag is most likely true due to the file being
copied and pasted out of the downloads folder. User 1 also appears to have used Microsoft
Word to view the file of interest, based on the userinteract and wordinteract flags, while not
having edited it due to this user not being the last modifier.
The time line helps clarify this even further, as there is an entire day between when the
file was last modified and its arrival on the system. The time line also shows that the user
opened their browser and navigated to their web mail page as soon as the file arrived. This
leads to the conclusion that the file was most likely collected via web mail, and then the web
history was deleted. Considering the web history resumes 11 seconds after the files arrival,
this is a fair conclusion to make. The user also appears to delete their web mail’s history,
further reinforcing the conclusion that they were attempting to cover up their tracks.
Provenance Narrative
Someone creates the file on another system, and User 1 downloads it via a web mail host
on 2006:06:08 at 11:41:38 using Internet Explorer. User 1 then deletes their web mail history.
Next, they move the file from the downloads folder to its current location. At some point
after arrival, it is not clear when, they also view the file using MW.
Image 2: File 1
The following booleans are set to True in for the first file of interest, a .xls (Microsoft
Excel) file, on image 2. Image 2 is a Windows XP machine with Service Pack 2 installed.
– Creator not Modifier - Looking at the file’s metadata, the software sees that the
file’s creator is not the same user as the file’s modifier. This is not a boolean flag, but
the software still outputs this information. The modifier’s name is also provided.
– datecheck - This boolean is false, as the creation date is not equivalent to the date
the file is first seen on system, resulting in the program noting that it is very unlikely
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the file was created locally. The file’s creation date, and the date it is first seen are
both provided to the user
Creation: 2005:12:31 - 08:22 // Arrival: 2009:11:16 - 10:39:45
– userinteract - A user, user 1, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:11:16 - 10:39:45
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:11:16 - 10:39:45
– impossiblelocal - The Operating System was installed on this system after the file
was created.
Creation: 2005:12:31 - 08:22
– editing - The file appears to have either been edited or copied within the system due
its mtime being much different than its arrival time. The mtime is provided to the
user.
– usbdatematch - A removable disk was used on the same day that the file first arrived
on system.
USB Connected: 2009:11:16 - 01:48
– skype30min - Skype was used within 30 minutes of the file first being seen on system.
Skype Execution: 2009:11:16 - 10:27:51
– samedaylogin - User 1 and User 2 have a last log in date that is the same day the
file arrived on the system.
User 1 Login: 2009:11:16 - 10:25:38
User 2 Login: 2009:11:16 - 10:29:12
– The time line includes entries that are not within a time span that infers local creation.
61

A summary of the time line produced by Dataprocess.py is available in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Time line Summary (Image 2: File 1)
The correlations presented show that the file could not have been created locally, as the
file existed before the operating system was installed. The creation date is also much earlier
than the file’s first sighting on the system. The last editor was a user that does not exist on
this system, meaning the file was not edited locally. Therefore, due to the editing flag and
being active, we know that the file must have been copied and pasted to its current location.
The user appears to have viewed the file using some office product based on the officeinteract
flag. They most likely used excel based on the file type. The file appears to have arrived by
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either USB or Skype based on the activated flags.
The time line further reinforces the notion that the file could not have been modified
locally, as the file last modified date and time is long before the file arrival time. A USB
device is connected on the same day as the file’s arrival; however, this occurs 9 hours previous
to the event of interest. Notepad is executed just before the file arrives, but it is unable to
create an xls file. It was likely used to take notes based on the contents of the file of interest.
This leaves Skype as the most likely source of the file. User 1 executes Skype within half
an hour of the file’s arrival. This is a reasonable time span for a conversation to take place,
during which a file is transferred. The execution of FTK does not appear to be relevant to
the file of interest. Therefore, User 1 most likely brought the file onto the system via Skype,
moved it to its current location, viewed the contents using excel, and copied some of the
information into a txt file.
Provenance Narrative
An external user edits the file after creation, but not locally. Someone creates the file
on another system, and then User 1 transfers it to this system via Skype on 2009:11:16 at
10:39:45. Next, a user copies and pastes it to its current location, most likely User 1. This
user then uses Excel to view the file.
Image 2: File 2
The following booleans are set to True for the second file of interest, a zip file, on image
2.
– userinteract - A user, user 1, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:12:10 - 16:11:12
– editing - The file appears to have either been edited or copied within the system due
its mtime being much different than its arrival time. The mtime is provided to the
user.
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– samedaylogin - User 3 has a last log in date that is the same day the file arrived on
the system.
User 3 Login: 2009:11:16 - 15:06:02
– ie5 content - References to the file exist within Internet Explorer’s Temporary Internet Files (TIF).
– The time line includes entries that are not within a time span that infers local creation.
A summary of the time line produced by Dataprocess.py is available in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Time line Summary (Image 2: File 2)
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A creation date is unavailable for this file, so the proper checks are unable to determine
local creation. Looking at the time line; however, it is obvious that the file did not originate
locally, as the file last modified date is long prior to that of the file’s arrival. This date
and time is pulled from the file contained within the compressed directory. From here, it is
important to note that the ie5 content flag is activated. This points to a high probability of
a web based file source. It is evident that user 1 most likely either copied or edited the file
of interest. The editing is most likely the compressing of the file.
The time line reinforces and further refines the theory of a web source. The web browser,
Safari, is installed and executed by user 1 20 minutes before the arrival of the file. Winzip
is also executed by user 1 moments before the file is first seen on the system. This makes
it highly likely that the file was downloaded by User 1 using Safari, then compressed and
moved to its current location.
Provenance Narrative
Someone creates the file externally, and someone else modifies it on 2007:3:10 at 17:31.
User 1 then downloads it via Safari on 2009:12:10 at 16:11:12. Next, User 1 compresses the
file, and moves it to its current location.
Image 2: File 3
The following booleans are set to True for the third file of interest, an mp3 file, on image
2.
– userinteract - A user, User 1, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:11:16 - 10:40:10
– usbdatematch - A removable disk was used on the same day that the file first arrived
on system.
USB Connected: 2009:11:16 - 1:48
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– skype30min - Skype was used within 30 minutes of the file first being seen on system.
Skype Execution: 2009:11:16 - 10:39:45
– samedaylogin - User 1 and user 2 have a last log in date that is the same day the file
arrived on the system.
User 1 Login: 2009:11:16 - 10:25:38
User 2 Login: 2009:11:16 - 10:29:12
– The time line includes entries that are not within a time span that infers local creation.

Figure 12: Time line Summary (Image 2: File 3)
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Limited information is available about this file due to the decreased metadata associated
with mp3 files compared to the other files analyzed. This results in only a few presented
correlations, showing Skype usage within 30 minutes of the file’s arrival, a USB connection
on the day of its arrival, and two user log ins on the arrival day. Fortunately, the time line
helps flesh out the remaining details necessary to determine how the file arrived on system.
This time line looks very similar to the one shown for image 2: file 1. It appears that this
file also arrived by Skype, most likely delivered along with File 1. It is also possible that
this file, along with file 1, were transferred via USB. Due to the time difference between the
USB connection and the file’s arrival; however, Skype is a much more likely file source. The
provenance available for this file is much more limited than what is achievable with Microsoft
Office files.
Provenance Narrative
Someone creates the file externally, and User 1 acquires it via a Skype conversation on
2009:11:16 at 10:40:10.
Image 2: File 4
The following booleans are set to True for the fourth file of interest, a .doc file, on image
2.
– userinteract - A user, User 1, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:11:16 - 7:36
– usbdatematch - A removable disk was used on the same day that the file first arrived
on system.
USB Connected: 2009:11:16 - 1:48
– skypedatematch - Skype was used on the same day that the file first arrived on the
system.
Skype Execution: 2009:11:16 - 10:39:45
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– samedaylogin - User 1 and user 3 have a last log in date that is the same day the file
arrived on the system.
User 1 Login: 2009:11:16 - 10:25:38
User 3 Login: 2009:11:16 - 15:06:02
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:11:16 - 7:36
– The time line includes entries that are not within a time span that infers local creation.

Figure 13: Time line Summary (Image 2: File 4)
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The correlations show that user 1 interacted with the file of interest, and that they are
the only user that interacted with the file. Therefore, user 1 allowed the file to arrive on the
system. User 1 used an office tool, most likely Microsoft Word, to interact with the file after
arrival, as the officeinteract flag shows. User 3 was logged on as well the day the file arrives,
so they may have some knowledge of the file’s arrival.
The time line entries do not infer local creation, as the file is created a full day before
it arrives on the local system. so the file must have originated from an external source. A
USB device was attached on the same day as the file’s arrival, and Skype was used as well,
marking them as potential sources for the file. However, upon looking at the time line, it
immediately becomes apparent that Skype is not the source of the file, as it is executed
after the file’s arrival (Removed from time line due to being out of scope). The USB device
is a possible source; however, Mozilla Firefox is the more probably file source based on it
being executed in greater proximity to the file’s arrival. Unfortunately, the system’s Fire
Fox history is erased, and therefore it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the
origins of the file.
Some other important facts that help attribute the file to a browser source is that the
name of the file’s last modifier is simply “Server”. This implies that the file was modified by
some sort of web server before its arrival on the current system. This modification occurs
moments before the file’s arrival, and is therefore likely caused by an automated system.
The user also interacts with many other .doc files during this time period, lending to the
suspicion that they downloaded all of these file’s within close proximity to one another using
the Fire Fox web browser.
Provenance Narrative
Someone creates the file externally on 2009:11:15 at 15:59, and User 1 downloads it using
Mozilla Firefox on 2009:9:8 at 4:50:50. User 1 then interacts with the file using Microsoft
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Word some time near its arrival, although it is unclear exactly when.
Image 3: File 1
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .jpg file, on image 3.
Image 3 is a Windows XP machine with Service Pack 2 installed.
– usbdatematch - A removable disk was used on the same day that the file first arrived
on system.
USB Connected: 2009:9:8 - 15:27:45
– ie5 content - References to the file exist within Internet Explorer’s Temporary Internet Files (TIF).
Download Hosts Visited: 2009:9:8 - 2:50:27-3:12:43
– userinteract - A user, User 1, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:9:8 - 4:50:50
When dealing with a .jpg file, there is limited metadata available. The creation date
and time of the file is therefore unknown. Because of this, many common correlation checks
are not possible. Fortunately, enough evidence is still present in this case to allow for an
adequate rebuilding of the file’s provenance. The first boolean, usbdatematch, shows that
one or more USB devices were connected on the day of the file’s arrival. Looking at the time
line, it is apparent that these drives are not the source of the file, as they are both connected
long after the file’s arrival.
The next boolean, ie5 content, shows that the file is referenced within Internet Explorer’s
TIF. This occurrence has a strong correlation with the file arriving via a browser. The time
line confirms this, showing that a user visited various download hosting websites about an
hour prior to the file’s arrival. The file has the [1] symbol appended to it, which means
that it was downloaded twice. Therefore, a probably provenance of the file is that User 1
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Figure 14: Time line Summary (Image 3: File 1)
downloaded the original file using the web browser at the last web download host noted in
the time line. They then most likely walked away from the computer for an hour, forgot
they downloaded the file, and downloaded it a second time, resulting in it arriving an hour
after the user visited the source web link.
Provenance Narrative
An external user creates the file, and User 1 later downloads it via Internet Explorer on
2009:9:8 at 4:50:50.
Image 4
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DataGather.py failed to gather the relevant information necessary to obtain the provenance on any of the file’s on image 4. This is due to log2timeline being unable to scan the
source due to one of its library’s, libsigscan, inability to read a necessary buffer. Joachim
Metz, the creator of log2timeline, responds to this error [22] but no fix is applied at this
time.
Image 5: File 1
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .jpg file, on image 5.
Image 5 is a Windows XP machine with Service Pack 2 installed.
– userinteract - Two users, Users 1 and 2, interacted with the file of interest.
– ie5 content - The file is referenced within Internet Explorer’s Temporary Internet
Files (TIF).
Unfortunately, not enough data is available on this file in order to reliably build a time
line. There is also insufficient metadata available to determine when the file was created,
or if it was modified at any point post-creation. References to the file exist within Internet
Explorer’s TIF; however, which means that it is almost certain the final arrived via a browser.
It is also apparent that two user’s on the system, user’s 1 and 2 interacted with the file postarrival.
Image 5: File 2
The following booleans are set to True for the second file of interest, a .doc file, on image
5.
– userinteract - A user, Users 2, interacted with the file of interest.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:12:18 - 16:15:00
– Creator not Modifier - Looking at the file’s metadata, the software sees that the
file’s creator is not the same user as the file’s modifier. This is not a boolean flag, but
the software still outputs this information. The modifier’s name is also provided.
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– ie5 content - References to the file exist within Internet Explorer’s Temporary Internet Files (TIF).
Sports Site Visit: 2009:12:18 - 16:01:27
– date check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest on the
same day that it was created.
Creation: 2009:12:18 - 16:15:00
Arrival: 2009:12:18 - 16:15:00
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
Creation: 2009:12:18 - 16:15:00
Arrival: 2009:12:18 - 16:15:00
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
Arrival/First Interaction: 2009:12:18 - 16:15:00
The results of running the software on this image/file show that the file was most likely
downloaded by user 2. A reference to the file is found within the TIF folder of Internet
Explorer, which correlates to the file arriving from a web source. It is also apparent, based
on the time line, that the user visited a variety of websites within close proximity to the
file’s arrival that may have been the source of the file. The most likely of these websites is
the sports website.
Based on the date check and time check flags, it is apparent that the file was created
at the same time that it arrived on the system. This could be due to the user using some
web based program to generate the file, and then downloading it upon generation. The
file is modified a year later based on its metadata. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear
how this occurred. The only program executions that occur within close proximity to this
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Figure 15: Time line Summary (Image 5: File 2)
modification is user 2 opening the Windows toolbar. The user name that last modified the
file also does not exist on the system, creating further confusion.
Provenance Narrative
A sports website creates the file on 2009:12:18 at 16:15:00, and User 2 downloads it
immediately afterward using Internet Explorer. An external user somehow modifies the file
on 2010:1:23 at 13:17:0.
Image 6: File 1
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .docx file, on image
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6. Image 6 is a Windows XP machine with Service Pack 3 installed.
– userinteract - A user, Users 1, interacted with the file of interest.
– date check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest on the
same day that it was created.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
Unfortunately, there wasn’t enough information available on this file to properly generate a time line. The only things that are valuable within the time line, are the creation,
modification, and arrival times. This information still provides valuable input, as all of these
dates/times are the same. This greatly increases the probability that the file was locally
created. The activated boolean variables help confirm these suspicions. It is evident that a
user interacted with the file of interest. The investigator is also able to see the file arrived
within 30 minutes of its creation, and that a user, obviously the user who interacted with
the file, used office to do something with the file. Based on all of these factors, user 1 used
Microsoft Word to create the file of interest.
Image 6: File 2
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .docx file, on image
6. Image 6 is a Windows XP machine with Service Pack 3 installed.
– userinteract - A user, Users 1, interacted with the file of interest.
– date check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest on the
same day that it was created.
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– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
This file presents a similar situation to the one previous to it. Considering it was found
in the same directory, and that the same boolean variables are active, the file most likely
originated from the same source. User 1 most likely created this file, just as they created file
1.
Image 7: File 1
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .doc file, on image
7. Image 7 is a Windows XP machine with Service Pack 2 installed.
– userinteract - A user, User 1, interacted with the file of interest.
– date check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest on the
same day that it was created.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
– time linerelevant removable disk usage - A time line entry references the file of
interest, as a well as a USB drive.
– systemuser - The file’s creator has the same user name as a user who exists on this
system.
– systemmod - The file’s last modifier has the same user name as a user who exists on
this system.
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There was not enough information to produce a time line, but enough conclusions are
drawn from the activated boolean variables to determine the source of the file. It is immediately apparent that a user on the system interacted with the file of interest. Looking at the
rest of the output, it is visible that this user is the same one who created and last modified
the file. This is apparent thanks to the systemuser and systemmod flag’s activation. It is
also evident that an office tool was used to interact with the file of interest.
A USB device is in the creating user’s recently used documents along with this file, which
often is a symptom of a USB source for the file. In this case, the overwhelming evidence for
local creation in this case overshadows this one USB factor. Based on the factors presented,
it is apparent that user 1 created the file on the system, and then modified it half an hour
later. The later modification time is visible based on the few obtained time line entries.
Image 7: File 2
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .doc file, on image 7.
– userinteract - A user, User 1, interacted with the file of interest.
– date check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest on the
same day that it was created.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
– time linerelevant removable disk usage - A time line entry references the file of
interest, as a well as a USB drive.
– systemuser - The file’s creator has the same user name as a user who exists on this
system.
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– systemmod - The file’s last modifier has the same user name as a user who exists on
this system.
The booleans activated for this file are the same as the one previous, with the same user
as the source. Therefore, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that user 1 locally created
this file as well.
Image 7: File 3
The following booleans are set to True for the first file of interest, a .doc file, on image 7.
– userinteract - A user, User 1, interacted with the file of interest.
– word modify day - Microsoft word was used on the same day as this file’s last modification.
– date check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest on the
same day that it was created.
– time check - Relevant time line entries exist that refer to the file of interest within
thirty minutes of its creation.
– officeinteract - Office was used to interact with the file.
– time linerelevant removable disk usage - A time line entry references the file of
interest, as a well as a USB drive.
– systemuser - The file’s creator has the same user name as a user who exists on this
system.
– systemmod - The file’s last modifier has the same user name as a user who exists on
this system.
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While this file’s provenance is almost the same as the one’s previous to it, and interested
differentiation occurs. The word modify day flag activates, and the program includes the
date and time of a Microsoft word execution with the time line. This shows that MW was
executed locally within 5 minutes of the file’s last modification date, by user 1. All other
factors are the same, which means that this simply helps reinforce the notion of local creation
and modification, and that the user, user 1, was well aware of the presence of this file.

4.3

Summary

In the majority of the test cases presented, the AutoProv successfully rebuilt the file’s
provenance. The controlled testing shows that all of the implemented boolean variables
behave as expected. Within the context of the RDC, they point out valuable correlations
that show the examiner likely sources of the file. When combined with the time line, if
available, the source of the file is almost always evident, as well as much of the activity
surrounding the arrival of the file.
Unfortunately, the data within images 6 and 7 did not allow for a thorough and complete
time line. This was due to a lack of file explorer history, and no obvious program executions
within the NTUSER.dat hive surrounding the arrival of the file. It is possible that this is due
to purposeful obfuscation, which this program is not designed to detect or circumnavigate.
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5.

Conclusions

It is possible to rebuild most of a file’s provenance on a Windows forensic image. This
task is far more difficult than it is on a live machine, as many of the resources available
when dealing with a live platform are not present on a forensic image, including the system’s
memory and the live tracking of user activities. Despite these limitations, there is more often
than not enough information available in the remaining provenance sources to recreate the
various activities related to a file of interest.
The metadata of select files provides essential data for provenance recreation. Microsoft
Office files, such as .xls and .docx files, often have highly useful metadata. In contrast, the
availability of this information is much more limited in other files, such as .mp3. This data
includes who created the document, when it was created, who last modified the document,
when that modification occurred, and when the document was last accessed. By combining
this information with the rest of the data gathered from within the system, provenance
accuracy is greatly increased. Therefore, provenance recreation is far more feasible when
dealing with a file that has detailed metadata available.
The registry hive contains many lucrative sources of information that aid in provenance
recreation. Primarily, the NTUSER hives for the various non-default users present on a
system contains a plethora of valuable data. Various program executions and other activities
that lead to the creation and/or arrival of a file on the system are found within this registry
hive. Compiling entries that occur within a relevant time span, and parsing them for possible
correlations yields many positive results that often enables the user to determine the file’s
source, and other interactions with the file that are relevant to its provenance.
One of the most unexpectedly valuable sources of file provenance was the Internet Explorer history directories. These directories and files were originally parsed to gather information on the users browsing activity. Upon closer inspection, it became apparent that they
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also contain information on all of the user’s file explorer browsing activities as well. This
information helped draw more conclusive provenance in many cases where a file’s metadata
was not quite as thorough.
In tandem with this, the various other browser histories often helped make it abundantly
apparent when a file was downloaded from a web source. For example, there was several
instances where the web address of a mail server was referenced just prior to the arrival of a
file. This makes it apparent that the user most likely acquired the file from the web server,
downloading it onto the system of interest.
Various other regions of the registry were explored as well, and found useful for determining the provenance of a file. For example, the system hive contains information on the
system’s installation date, as well as various USB interactions. This helped to determine
when a file was created long before the installation of a system, lending to the conclusion
that the file could not have been created locally. The USB interactions, when in close proximity to a file’s arrival on system, helped to determine whether a file could have possibly
been transferred from a referenced USB device.

5.1

Future Work

The metadata of many of these files was used to help determine their provenance. Unfortunately, it is possible for a savvy user to easily modify these values, obfuscating the
true provenance. In the worst case, these alterations could lead to the incrimination of a
unrelated party. Methods to detect these alterations, and notify the user of their occurrence,
would be useful in ensuring the accuracy of the provenance presented.
There are additional methods that lead to the obfuscation of a file’s provenance. A
powerful tool that is briefly mentioned earlier in this thesis is Timestomp. This tool alters
many of the values that this thesis uses to determine the provenance of a file. Any methods
of detection that aid a user’s awareness of the use of this software are valuable. Detection of
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the use of Timestomp is a highly difficult proposition, and therefore it was outside the scope
of this thesis.
There are many ways a file arrives on a system, and even more that it is interacted with.
This thesis barely touches on the surface of these possibilities, seeking only to provide a
proof of concept that it is possible to recreate a file’s provenance if enough possible interaction and arrival sources are accounted for. The automated browser history investigation
that this software accomplishes is useful for determining when web email services are used.
Unfortunately, it does not account for the use of software such as Outlook to acquire emails
and their respective attachments. An excellent addition to this project would therefore be
the automated detection of various Outlook interactions, and any history associated with
outlook itself.
Another possible avenue of arrival is FTP. There is a variety of FTP software that are
capable of transferring a file from one machine to another. Exhaustive accounting for each
of these pieces of software would be arduous, therefore finding some sort of common denominator between files that arrive by this methodology is essential. Finding this common
sign within the registry or some similar location may allow the software to automatically
determine when FTP accommodates a file’s arrival.
A similar problem this thesis encountered was detecting when torrenting software is used
to acquire a file. The method presented in the methodology shows, using FrostWire as
an example, that it is possible to exhaustively account for the software used to obtain a
file. Modifying this method into something that is more general would be highly valuable for
ensuring similar software works in many cases, and that it remains viable as future torrenting
software is introduced.
This software uses the MAC times in order to determine when activities such as file
movement occur. These values are modifiable, and therefore a more resilient method of
determining when movements, cut-paste, and accesses occur would be beneficial to the func82

tionality of AutoProv. For example, finding another sign of these activities present in the
registry or some other relevant location, and comparing this with the MAC values present on
the file of interest, could lead to interesting insights into whether value tampering occurred.
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Appendix A: Abbreviations
DFRWS

Digital Forensic Research Workshop

DOJ

Department of Justice

EXIF

Exchangeable Image File Format

FPMS

File Provenance Maintenance System

FTK

Forensic Tool Kit

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

MAC

Modification, Access, Change

MW

Microsoft Word

PVM

Provenance Versioning Model

RAM

Random Access Memory

RDC

Real Data Corpus

SAM

Security Account Manager

TSK

The Sleuth Kit

USB

Universal Serial Bus

WAP

Wireless Access Point
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